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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini merupakan suatu usaha untuk meneliti keunggulan komparatif dan tingkat perlin-
dungan/beban ekonomi untuk beberapa komoditas bahan baku pakan dan petemakan. Analisis keung-
gulan komparatif dilakukan dengan mempergunakan konsep rasio sumberdaya domestik, sedang ting-
kat perlindunganlbeban ekonomi diukur dengan tingkat perlindungan nominal, tingkat perlindungan 
efektif dan subsidi implisit. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa produksi jagung di Indonesia lebih 
menguntungkan apabila dipakai untuk memenuhi kebutuhan domestik. Produksi kacang kedele di 
Jawa Barat temyata tidak efisien. Kacang kedele mempunyai keunggulan komparatif apabila dihasil-
kan di Jawa Tengah dan di luar Jawa. Ubikayu dan beras mempunyai keunggulan komparatif yang 
tinggi di seluruh Indonesia. Produksi susu sangat tidak ekonomis. Sedangkan produksf daging sapi, 
babi dan ayam ras mempunyai keunggulan komparatif yang tinggi. Produksi telur lebih menguntung-
kan untuk konsumsi dalam negeri. Produksi telur mempunyai daya saing ekspor jika dihasilkan di 
Lampung dan Bogor. Struktur perlindungan komoditas secara umum tidak konsisten d~ngan efisiensi 
produksi komoditas. Insentif ekonomi cenderung bias untuk petani di Pulau Jawa. 
ABSTRACT 
This study is an investigation on comparative advantage and economic incentives of some major 
feed-stuffs and livestock products. The comparative advantage is analyzed using the domestic resource 
cost ratio criterion, whereas, economic incentive is measured using the nominal and effective protection 
rates, and implicit subsidy. The study shows that the com production in Indonesia would be more 
beneficial economically if used domestically. The soybean production in West Java is not economical. 
The soybean only has comparative advantage if produced in Central Java and the islands outside Java. 
Cassava and rice have comparative advantage wherever they are produced. The dairy farming is highly 
uneconomical. Whereas beef, pork, and broiler productions are highly competitive, even for exporta-
tion. The egg production is more beneficial for domestic consumption. The egg production is competi-
tive for exportation if produced in Lampung and Bogor. The commodities protection structures are 
generally in consistent with their economic efficiency configuration. The economic incentives are gene-
rally biased toward Java. 
Paper Presented at the Workshop of Pacific Economic Conference Agricultural Policy, Trade and 
Development Task Force, Seoul, May 15-18 1989. 
•)Senior Agricultural Economist and Agricultural Economists Center for Agro Economic Research, Bogor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an increasingly interdependent world, domestic policies in a country can be 
easily transmitted to other countries. It should be clear that not only trade policies 
but also commodity production and consumption policies as well as macroecono-
mic fiscal and monetary policies of one country can be hatmful to other countries. 
Under such a situation, cooperation among trading partners are needed to harmo-
nize their policies for mutual benefits. 
The objectives and interest of each country may be different one to another. 
Regional cooperation among smaller number of countries would be more plausible 
both economically and politically. Accordingly, economic cooperation among the 
Pacific countries should be a feasible proposal. 
Indonesia is a net import of livestock and dairy products and a net import of 
feedgrains especially com and soybean. With increasing income and population the 
demand for meat, eggs and milk and other livestock products will increase at a 
rapid rate. At current level of income demand elasticity for livestock products are 
elastic. 
In the last 20 years (1968-1988) the rate of growth of production of meat, egg 
and milk were 7.3 percent, 14.8 percent and 12.6 percent respectively. In addition, 
the livesto.ck subsector plays an important role in the national economy. This sub-
sector contributed about 10o/o of the agricultural GDP and provided almost 4.0 per-
cent of employment in agriculture. 
At current level of consumption, domestic production of chicken meat and eggs 
has satisfied domestic demand, whereas beef slightly deficit and dairy products has 
only been able to provide 40 percent of domestic consumption. 
To meet the increasing demand for the livestock products the Government of 
Indonesia has implemented a set of policies on livestock production, feedgrain pro-
duction and trade. These policies aimed to give incentive to producer and to 
protect consumers from international price fluctuations. To be able to implement 
these policies effectively and efficiently it is important to have adequate and 
reliable informations economic analysis of the livestock commodity system. 
This present study is part the PECC Task-Force Livestock and Feed Grains 
Study Programme. This Indonesia Country study will be focused on feed grains, 
beef, dairy and poultry industries. The general objective of this study is to examine 
the feasibility and to formulate activities of regional cooperation among the 
Pacific Countries to achieve domestic and regional objectives. 
The specific objectives of this Indonesia country study are: 
(1) To describe the structure and performance of the livestock and feed stuff 
subsectors. 
(2) To review government policies related to livestock and feed stuff sub sectors. 
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(3) To examine the impacts of the government policies on the promotion of effi-
ciency and equity. 
(4) To measure comparative advantages (competitiveness) of domestic livestock and 
feed stuff production relative to various regions, technologies and farm structure. 
(5) Examining whether existing incentives encourage development in a way that is 
consistent with comparative advantage, or hinder such development. 
(6) To develop alternative incentive structures to improve resource allocation 
within the livestock and feed stuff sub sector. 
METHODOLOGY 
Indonesia is a large country. Its resource potentials vary from region to 
region. Presumably, each region has comparative advantage on some feed and live-
stock production over the others. A study of comparative advantage, therefore, 
should be more appropriately conducted on regional basis rather than aggregate 
national basis. This regional disaggregation is also useful to capture any regional 
biases on the government incentives. Regional bias government incentives have been 
major issues in Indonesia economic development. 
In addition to appropriate disaggregation, another important aspect of com-
parative advantage study is trade regime. Trade regime indicates marketing orien-
tation of the domestic products. There are three trade regime scenarios investigated 
in this study. The trade regimes are interregional trade (IR), import substitution 
(IS), and export promotion (EP). 
The incentive criteria used in this study are Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), 
Effective Protection Rate (EPR), Effective Subsidy Rate (ESR), and Implicit 
Tariff (IT). The comparative advantage criteria are Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), 
Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR), and Net Economic Benefit (NEB). 
The Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) is the ratio of the difference between the 
domestic producer price and world (border) price of a commodity expressed in 
percentage. A positive NPR indicates domestic price protection of the output which 
is an incentive to expand production. A positive IT, on the other hand, means an 
implicit taxation on inputs a production disincentive. 
The net effect of both NPR and IT can be calculated using the formula for 
Effective Protection Rate (EPR). The EPR measures the degree to which protec-
tion causes actual value added to diverge from the value added that would have 
prevailed in the absence of protection. A positive EPR implies that production of 
a particular commodity is receiving net positive incentive, while a negative EPR 
indicates net disincentive. 
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The Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) can be formally stated as the ratio of the 
domestic costs of production and the difference between the border price of output 
and foreign (or tradable) costs. Comparative advantage is measured by the re-
source cost ratio (RCR), which is the DRC value devided by the shadow exchange 
rate of currency. 
The relevant values of DRC and RCR are derived only when the border price 
of output is greater than the foreign costs of producing it. Otherwise, it is clear 
that the production system has no comparative advantage, since it cannot cover 
the foreign cost of producing it. 
For a useful analysis the DRC and RCR comparative advantage indicators 
will be combined with profitability indicators. The profitability indicators include 
private profitability (Net Financial Profit = NFP) and social profitability (Net Eco-
nomic Benefit = NEB). The NFP is computed in the usual way, that is revenue 
minus cost per unit output. 
As an indicator of comparative advantage, the concept of NEB has direct rela-
tionship with DRC. A production system has a comparative advantage whenever 
the NEB is positive. The DRC approach will be employed using assumption of two 
basic trade regimes: Import Substitution (IS), each activity is assumed producing 
import substitution commodity, and Export Promotion (EP) assesses the viability of 
the country to export the commodities under study. 
The Data 
The data used for this study include secondary and primary data. The secon-
dary data are obtained from various institutions such as Ministry of Agriculture, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, National Logistic Agency, and research institutions. 
Primary data is collected through field survey. The secondary data is collected to 
obtain input-output coefficient of livestock farmings and their marketing costs. 
Input-output coefficients for feed grain farmings are obtained from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics. 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Indonesia is now in transition toward a more open economy. A massive deregu-
lation programs have been conducted in the last five years. The deregulations 
include banking, trade and industry, taxes and tariff. The policy is designed to 
promote domestic production and exports. 
Livestock production in Indonesia is geared through three types of develop-
ment pattern namely: (a) smallholder household farming, (b) large scale private 
farming, and (c) nucleus smallholders farming system. 
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Livestock Production Organization 
Indonesian livestock production is dominated by household farming. As we 
can see from Table 1, in any type of livestock farming the household farmings own 
at least 94 percent of the animal populations. The private enterprises are not 
surprising, therefore, that the livestock development programs are concentrated on 
household farmings. The livestock development policies are designed to increase 
production (value added), farmer's income, labor absorption, export promotion 
and import substitution. The livestock sector development is also expected to help 
increasing food nutritional quality of the people. 
Table 1. Composition of animal holding by type of enterprise (percentage), 1983 
Farming Household Enterprise Total 
1. Beef and dairy cow 99.4 0.6 100.0 
2. Buffalo 99.7 0.3 100.0 
3. Horse 99.9 0.1 100.0 
4. Goat and sheep 100.0 0.0 100.0 
5. Pig 96.0 4.0 100.0 
6. Poultry* 93.7 6.3 100.0 
*Chicken and ducks. 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Household farming development is encouraged through cooperative system. 
Extension of strong cooperative system is both for political and economic reasons. 
The cooperative system is· recomlnended economic organization according to 
the national constitution. Various government incentives are channeled through 
cooperative and may be provided to cooperative members. 
The success of milk cooperative system is the result of government heavy 
intervention. The most important one is on milk marketing. Fresh milk domestic 
market is controlled by the government by arranging the amount of fresh milk 
supplied to the processors and at a determined price. With this, the cooperative 
members have warranted market for their milk product. In addition to marketing 
certainty, the cooperative members also obtain various incentives such as credits 
(usually in cow bred and feed), artificial insemination service, and animal health 
service. 
Livestock Credits 
Based on its sources and implementation, livestock farming credit are of four 
types: (1) commercial credit; (2) livestock development program; (3) government 
aid; (4) foreign aid projects. The commercial credit is the ordinary commercial bank 
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credit. It can be obtained individually with the usual banking credit procedures. 
This type of credit is usually provided for larger farmers. The government program 
related credit is organized by the government as a part of a particular development 
package. It is usually provided to small farmers extensively. The foreign aid 
project is a livestock development program funded with foreign aid, usually with 
counter part fund from the government. The government aid program is a special 
aid for the poorest farmers. This include the presidential aid and crash program aid. 
Without any doubt the commercial credit in livestock sector is quite large. This 
is especially true since the rapid development of livestock related private enterprise 
since late 1970's. The increase in number and size of the private enterprises is 
especially high in feed manufacturing industry, milk processing industries and poultry 
farming. Unfortunately, this can not be substantiate with empirical data. 
Cooperative credit is given to farmers, members of rural cooperative (KUD 
Model). The requirements to obtain the credit are very limit. Those who have 
experience in livestock farming, even does not own any livestock, may qualify to 
get the credit. In other words, livestock farmers, fence laborers and grass collectors 
are all elligible. 
The cummulative value of credit distributed to the farmers and the unrepaid 
portion for various government programs are presented in Table 2°. From the table 
we can see that the largest amount of the credit is channelled through the BANKOP 
(Cooperative aid). This is an indicator of the Government objective to promote 
Table 2. The cummulative amount of total credit and unrepaid credit by programs (by April1985). 
Total Credit Unrepaid2 
No. Program (Million Rp.) {Million Rp.) (OJo) 
1. PUSP 4 373.6 855.4 (19.56) 
2. PUTP 10 707.8 
a. Fattening 8 598.0 618.7 ( 7.20) 
b. Breeding 2 109.8 593.6 (28.14) 
3. BIMAS Ayam 3 249.1 
a. Layer 2 199.4 242.5 (11.03) 
b. Broiler 1 050.7 442.1 (42.07) 
4. Keppres 50/81 19 475.9 
a. Layer 15 396.1 1 527.4 (16.42) 
b. Broiler 4 079.8 1 195.1 (29.29) 
5. RCP 21 430.8 n.d.a n.d.a 
6. BANKOP 36 727.6 n.d.a n.d.a 
7. INTEK 87.0 n.d.a n.d.a 
Total 96 052.8 unknown 
Source: Directorate General of Livestock data flies. 
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livestock farming through cooperative system. The unrepaid credit is quite high, 
ranging from 7.20 to 42.07 percent. The lowest credit repayment rate is for broiler. 
This is reasonable since poultry farmers have faced a hard time due to price instabi-
lity. Many farmers have loosing money. The highest loss has been for broiler farmers. 
Livestock Product Trade 
Livestock product market is one of the most heavily controlled by the govern-
ment. This may be partly due to the role of the livestock product as basic food. 
The government regulates both international and domestic (especially inter-
regional) trades. The trade regulations, however, are quite selective. They vary 
according to the kind of products. In general, the livestock trade policies are 
designed to protect domestic industry, farmers and consumers. 
Perhaps in an attempt to protect domestic consumers, meat and egg exporta-
tion are controlled by the government. Beef and dairy cattle exportation is strictly 
prohibited. Chicken meat, pig, goat and meat may be exported but with special 
permit or licence. Indonesian meat export has been very small in recent years, 
however there is an indication of increasing in meat import. 
Import tariff varies from zero to 40 percent. Breeding animal importations do 
not have tariff. The tariff restrictions are partly designed to protect domestic 
industry and farmers. 
In the spirit of farmers protection, the government also places quantitative 
restriction on milk import, in addition to tariff. The quantitative restriction is com-
monly known as milk ratio. Milk importation is linked to the use of milk domestic 
production by milk processing industry through a quota system. The milk import 
quota is given to each milk processing company in proportion to the amount of 
domestic produced milk used by the company. 
Livestock interregional trade is regulated by the government through a quota 
system. The amount and direction of interregional trade is determined every year 
by the Director General of Livestock. 
Occasionally, the government may intervene directly in the market to stabilize 
the meat price. The market operation may be conducted by the National Logistic 
Agency (BULOG). This market operation could happen during the hari raya 
lebaran (moslem holiday). 
Feed Stuff Production 
Feed stuff can be either green vegetation, agricultural waste and feed con-
centrate. Feed concentrate basic ingredients are corn, soybean, rice bran, cassava 
and wheat pollard. Wheat is not produced domestically. The government involve-
ment in green vegetation production is very limited. If there is any, it is basicly in 
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the provision of high yielding seed. The major government involvements are in 
rice, corn, soybean, and cassava production. The most important policies are certi-
fied rice seed, fertilizer and pesticide subsidies. These subsidies, however, have been 
reduced gradually. This is in line with the government economic deregulation pro-
gram. Currently pesticide subsidy has been pass out and fertilizer prices still at 
40 percent to 60 percent subsidized. 
The Government also set floor price at the farm level on corn and soybean. 
Cassava, however, does not have floor price. Their ratios with paddy floor price 
decrease overtime. This indicates that the government support price policy is 
biased toward rice. 
The feed grains and tuber are in competition with rice production. Rice is the 
main food in Indonesia. Rice production does not only enjoy input subsidies, but 
also price support, extension service, irrigation and official encouragement. The 
rice biased policy discourages feed grain and tuber production. 
Feed Grain Trade 
Most feed stuffs trades, such as corn, soybean, soybean cake, and fish meal, 
are controlled by the government. These commodities are net imported products. 
Importation of the products is the monopoly right of the National Logistic Agency 
(BULOG). BULOG then distributes the product to various users. Recently corn trade 
has b.een deregulated and liberalized. 
The domestic markets are controlled by the BULOG by changing the price 
.level and quantity of the distributed products. The purpose of the government 
market intervention is to stabilize the price at a level which is considered fair to 
both producer and consumer. 
Domestic procurement of corn has been insignificant. The floor price have been 
ineffective in the sense that it has always been below the market level. In addition 
storage of domestic produced corn is difficult because of its high moisture content. 
Market operation is conducted by stabilizing price and supply facing the local feed 
industry by releasing corn from the stock and importation. 
Domestic procurement of soybean grain and meal are also very small. The floor 
price has been far below the market price. The main instrument for price stabiliza-
tion has been controlling imports. The soybean grain and meal are distributed 
directly to large feed meal, Feed Importer Association, and Tofu and Tempe 
Producer Cooperative. 
Feed Industry 
The feed industry expanded very rapidly in the early 1970's. This rapid expan-
sion had been closely related to the rapid growth of the poultry industry due to 
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introduction of modem poultry farming. The modem poultry farming is charac-
terized by; (1) highly spesialized, (2) using high yielding chicks, {3) using manufac-
tured feed; (4) using modem rearing practices. 
In 1986 there were 71 feedmills registered with the Directorate General of Live-
stock. The feed mills were located in nine provinces (Table 3). Most of the feed-
mills are mainly concentrated in West Java (33), East Java (10), Central Java (8) 
and North Sumatera (7). Although there were only three feed mills in Jakarta, but 
in terms of production it placed in the third rank. 
Table 3. Feed mills distribution, production capacity and actual production, 1986. 
Production (ton/month) Capacity 
Province Number utilization 
Capacity Actual (OJo) 
Jakarta 3 18450 13850 75.0 
West Java 33 120300 46578 38.8 
Central Java 8 9150 4538 49.0 
Yogyakarta 2 750 190 25.3 
East Java 10 126450 48580 38.6 
North Sumatera 7 16960 8580 50.5 
West Sumatera 3 1020 420 42.2 
Lampung 4 10900 3140 19.6 
Riau 300 30 10.0 
Total 71 304280 126148 41.5 
The five largest feed mills production regions are East Java, West Java, Jakar-
ta, North Sumatera and Latl!pung. But unfortunately, the capacity utilization is 
very low in all provinces except Jakarta. The capacity utilization reached 75 
percent in 1986. But in other regions, the capacity utilization ranged from 10.0 to 
50.5 percent. 
The very low capacity utilization rates indicate over expansion of the feed mill 
industry. The over expansion and under capacity problem of the feed mill industry 
is partly induced by Government Policies. In early 1970's the industry enjoys 
various incentives such as low interest rates, over value exchange rate, easy credit, 
and free importation of raw materials. At the same time the demand of feed had 
been increased rapidly. But then the Government changed it policies. The iinporta-
tion and distribution of feed raw materials were taken over by the Government. 
The policy was intended to conserve foreign exchange and to help small size feed 
mills at the same time the growth of the poultry production was slowed down. The 
growth rate of the demand for feed also slowed down. But the feedmills were 
already constructed more than sufficient to supply effective feed demand. 
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COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Com 
The summary of economic comparative advantage for corn for each region 
and trade regimes are presented in Table 4. The table shows that the domestic corn 
production is economicly feasible in all regions under the interregional and 
import substitution regimes. The production is not feasible if intended for export 
in two regions, West Java and East Java. The corn production in these two regions 
should be used for domestic consumption, either for import substitution or inter 
regional trade. The average production for open polinated corn in all regions was 
around 2.0 ton/ha. The potential to improve the level of production is still very 
large, because potential yield with improved technological package can reach 4 
ton!ha. 
Table 4. Summary of economic comparative advantage of com by region and trade regimes. 
Region Trade RCR DRC 
NEB NFP 
regimes (Rp/kg) (Rp/kg) 
West Java IS 0.85641 1408 20.64 18.43 
EP 1.52588 2509 -49.47 -56.56 
Central Java IR 0.64226 1056 50.18 77.07 
IS 0.53806 885 67.85 98.88 
EP 0.93058 1530 7.08 7.52 
East Java IR 0.79586 1308 21.71 14.64 
IS 0.69801 1148 40.85 55.59 
EP 1.23166 2025 -20.87 -20.46 
Sumatera IR 0.55306 909 59.72 56.94 
IS 0.46642 767 73.96 96.37 
EP 0.98264 1615 1.62 17.33 
Balt& N. Tenggara IR 0.44179 726 78.70 93.70 
IS 0.41974 690 89.11 107.28 
EP 0.72184 1187 27.39 16.71 
South Sulawesi IR 0.47879 787 75.38 48.55 
IS 0.8454 1390 91.25 43.01 
EP 0.75442 1240 24.88 17.21 
Kalimantan IS 0.47165 775 81.82 110.91 
EP 0.82205 1351 17.67 6.56 
RCR = Resource Cost Ratio; DRC = Domestic Resource Cost; 
NEB = Net Economic Benefit; NFP = Net Financial Profitability 
The most efficient producing regions are Bali & Nusa Tenggara, Sumatera, and 
Kalimantan. Both economic and financial profit are also high in Bali & Nusa Teng-
gara, Sumatera and Sulawesi. Hence corn production in these three regions should 
be promoted for both domestic and export purposes. 
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Based on the above analysis, the suggested trade directions for each producing 
region are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Suggested corn trade directions for each producing region. 
Producing Region Import Interregional 
substitution trade 
West Java West Java 
Central Java Central Java Jakarta 
East Java East Java Jakarta 
Sumatera Sumatera Jakarta 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara Bali & Nusa Kalimantan 
Tenggara 
Sulawesi Sulawesi Sulawesi 
Kalimantan Kalimantan 
Cassava 
. Export 
promotion 
Denpasar 
Ujung Pandang 
Balik Papan 
Table 6 shows that the domestic resource cost ratios for cassava were less than 
0.5 in all regions. Hence, the cassava production is very competitive in all region 
of Indonesia. The dried cassava production should be promoted as an export 
commodity. 
Table 6. Comparative advantage indicators of dried cassava production by region and trade regime, 
1986. 
Trade Resource cost Domestic Net economic 
Region regime ratio resource benefit 
(Rp/US$) (Rp/kg) 
West Java EP 0.45908 754.73 84.28 
Central Java EP 0.40589 667.28 93.06 
East Java EP 0.46067 757.34 83.23 
Sumatera EP 0.29620 486.95 109.32 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara EP 0.26586 437.07 ll3.96 
Sulawesi EP 0.31036 510.23 105.90 
Kalimantan EP 0.26139 429.73 116.05 
EP : Effective protection. Official exchange rate in 1986 was Rp 1644/US$. 
If we look at production centers, the most efficient dried cassava producing 
regions are Kalimantan, Bali, Nusa Tenggara and Sumatera. The cassava produc-
tion in Java is less efficient than that off Java. The domestic resource cost ratios 
in Central Java, West Java and East Java were higher than outside Java regions. 
Therefore export promotion trade regime cassava production in the above regions 
outside Java should be increased. 
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Soybean 
In Table 7 we can see that soybean production in West Java does not have 
comparative advantage either under the import substitution regime nor under the 
export promotion regime. Clearly from the economic point of view, the soybean 
production in West Java is not feasible. It is better to use land resource in West 
Java for non soybean farming, and its soybean requirement supplied from other 
region. 
Table 7. Summary of economic comparative advantage of soybean, 1986. 
Producing Trade Resource Domestic Net economic 
region regimes· cost ratio resource cost benefit (Rp/kg) 
West Java IS 1.40797 2315 -110.29 
EP 1.59217 2618 -151.56 
Central Java IR 0.72661 1195 82.27 
IS 0.66206 1088 104.38 
EP 0.76028 1250 71.44 
East Java IR 1.04375 1716 -11.84 
IS 0.94716 1557 14.82 
EP 1.07263 1763 -19.55 
Sumatera IS 0.55759 917 134.65 
EP 0.65924 1084 99.72 
Kalimantan IS 0.78492 1290 64.19 
EP 0.90005 1480 28.46 
Sulawesi IS 0.46451 764 167.49 
EP 0.55830 918 132.65 
Bali & Nusa IR 0.47732 785 166.71 
tenggara IS 0.48753 801 151.85 
EP 0.56779 933 132.93 
OER = Official exchange Rate = Rp 1644 /US$. 
Soybean production in East Java is only feasible economicly under the 
import substitution regime, under the interregional and export promotion regime, 
the soybean farming. in the region is highly under the break even point. Clearly, 
this region is still highly promising to become feasible under the three trade 
regimes. This can be improved by changing technology and resource (inputs) 
allocations. 
The other producing regions, Central Java, Sumatera, Bali and Nusa Teng-
gara,/Sulawesi and Kalimantan are economicly feasible to produce soybean. The 
three most efficient producing regions are Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara and 
Sumatera : This is consistent with the farming analysis in the last section. Kaliman-
tan, however is barely break even under the export promotion regime. Average pro-
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duction of soybean was still very low i.e around 1.2 ton/ha. Therefore there is 
a relatively large potential yield improvement, since potential yield can reach 2.5 
ton/ha. 
Based on this analysis the suggested efficient production and trade orientation 
may be summarized as in Table 8. The analysis also shows that the most efficient 
resource use is always under the import substitution regime, and then followed by 
the interregional trade. In other words, the domestic soybean production should 
be directed for domestic consumption first. This is also consistent with the present 
situation where Indonesia is still deficit in soybean. 
Table 8 Suggested producing regions and trade directions. 
Producing region 
1. Central Java 
2. East Java 
3. Sumatera 
4. Bali & Nusa Tenggara 
5. Sulawesi 
6. Kalimantan 
Rice 
Trade direction 
Intra province, West Java, Jakarta, export 
Intra province 
Intra island, export 
Intra regional, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, export 
Intra island, export 
Intra island 
Rice production is economicly feasible in all regions and all trade regimes. These 
indicate that rice farming should be promoted in Indonesia. This study shows that 
the rice production is also beneficial for exportation. Indonesia has comparative 
advantage in producing rice (Table 9). 
If we look at by trade regimes, then we could see that the most efficient rice 
production orientation is for domestic use, import substitution and then followed 
by Interregional Trade. Accordingly, the policy for using domestic rice production 
primarily for domestic consumption is consistent with efficient resource allocation. 
In other words, although rice exportation is feasible in recent years, but it is 
economicly more efficient if the rice production is used domestically. 
The most efficient rice producing regions are Sulawesi and Kalimantan, and 
then followed by Bali & Nusa Tenggara and Sumatera. As it has been mentioned, 
the rice production outside Java is more efficient than in Java. Accordingly, rice 
production in Indonesia should be promoted especially outside Java. Presently, 
most Government supports and facilities have been concentrated in Java and Java 
contributed to nearly 60 percent of total rice production. 
The need to promote rice production outside Java is very important to 
maintain rice self-sufficiency which was already achieved in 1984. Presently, the 
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Table 9. Comparative advantage indicators of rice production by regions and trade regimes, 1986. 
Region 
Trade Resource Domestic Net economic 
regimes cost ratio resource benefit 
cost 
West Java IR 0.49624 815.82 153.47 
IS 0.46147 758.66 166.06 
-
EP 0.69814 1147.74 73.01 
Central Java IS 0.49624 815.82 153.47 
EP 0.40397 664.13 182.54 
East Java IR 0.49230 809.34 143.66 
IS 0.45158 742.40 158.57 
EP 0.66493 1093.14 76.72 
Sumatera IR 0.35004 575.47 197.16 
IS 0.30841 507.03 216.94 
EP 0.47635 783.12 132.85 
Sulawesi IR 0.28487 468.33 215.26 
IS 0.25626 421.29 230.79 
EP 0.36516 600.32 159.35 
Kalimantan IS 0.27867 458.13 228.64 
EP 0.43728 718.89 145.04 
Bali & N. Tenggara IS 0.29957 492.49 221.42 
EP 0.46345 761.91 137.84 
Government still concentrates its efforts in Java by launching the so called Special 
Intensification program (INSUS). Perhaps, this kind of policy could only solve short 
run problems. The more plausible policy to increase rice production sustainably might 
be through promoting intensification and developing irrigation outside Java. 
Dairy 
From Table 10 we can see that the dairy industry is not yet economicly feasible 
for all types of enterprise technology and trade regimes. The domestic resource cost 
ratios for the corporate farming range from 1.67 to 5.02, whereas for household 
farming they range from 1.40 to 3.52. 
This findings indicate that the cross breed is more suitable than imported breed 
in Indonesia. This is especially true for the small farmers. The dairy farming in 
Indonesia is dominated by smallholders. The government also induces the dairy 
development through the nucleus private corporate and smallholders system. 
Accordingly, the present study shows that the dairy farming development should 
be directed to use the cross breed. 
Milk processing industries are concentrated in Jakarta and Surabaya. 
Accordingly, the raw material (fresh milk) must be transported from the producing 
regions to the milk processing locations. Table 10 shows that the interregional 
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trades of semi processed milk production in Salatiga, Central Java, are the most 
inefficient among the trade orientations. This is due to high transportation cost and 
inefficient marketing system. 
Table 10. Summary of comparative advantage criteria for milk production. 
Producing Technology Trade Wholesale Resource Domestic Net 
region regimes location cost resource economic 
ratio cost benefit 
Corporate Imported breed IR Jakarta 5.02 8315 -208 
Surabaya 3.19 5275 -170 
Ban dung 2.82 4659 -149 
IS Salatiga 2.88 4767 -150 
EP Semarang 2.85 4718 -155 
Cross breed IR Jakarta 2.20 3640 -204 
Surabaya 1.74 2883 -155 
Ban dung 1.67 2767 -139 
IS Salatiga 1.70 2819 -142 
EP Semarang 1.67 2767 -142 
Household Imported IR Jakarta 3.52 5828 -176 
Surabaya 2.66 4398 -147 
Bandung 2.70 4463 -138 
IS Salatiga 2.40 3979 -127 
EP Semarang 2.36 3908 -131 
Cross breed IR Jakarta 1.74 2885 -168 
Surabaya 1.40 2317 -109 
Bandung 1.45 2400 -115 
IS Salatinga 1.45 2407 -115 
EP Sell;larang 1.45 2240 - 99 
Based on this finding we can conclude that with given technology, farming 
system and prices of the dairy industry in Indonesia are not efficient in resource use. 
If the milk production must be produced domestically, then the most efficient pro-
duction orientation is import substitution. This means that the milk processing must 
be located in the same location with the dairy farm. The processed milk produced 
is then used for local consumption. With this consolidation of the dairy farming 
and milk processing plants locations is useful to reduce transportation cost. Hence 
the milk production will· be more efficient. 
Pork 
From Table 11 we can see that the domestic resource cost ratio (DRCR) of 
pork meat products were always less than unity. The data from the table indicate 
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that the pork meat production is feasibile in Indonesia either for domestic use 
(interregional trade and import substitutions) or for export (export promotions). 
If we look at by trade regime, we can see from Table 11 that the most efficient 
trade orientation is import substitution and then followed by export promotion 
and interregional trade. The efficiency differentials between the trade regions, ho-
wever, are quite small. Hence the pork production can be directed for any trade 
regimes. 
This study also indicates that the intensive household pig farming is more effi-
cient than the corporate pig farming. As we can see from the above table the 
domestic cost ratios of the corporate intensive pig farming are around 0.6 under 
all trade regimes. This indicates that the pig production in Indonesia should be 
directed toward household intensive farming. The household intensive farming would 
generate higher economic benefit and more efficient than the corporate farming. 
However, for export standarization and quality of the products should be improved. 
Table 11. Summary of swine meat comparative advantage criteria (Rp/Kg). 
Producing Technology 
region 
Bali Intensive 
Bali Unintensive 
Central Java Corporate & 
Intensive 
IR Interregional Trade. 
IS Import Substitution. 
EP = Export Promotion. 
Trade 
regime 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
Wholesale/ 
Port 
Kalimantan 
Surabaya 
Bali 
Bali 
Kalimantan 
Surabaya 
Bali 
Bali 
Jakarta 
Semarang 
Semarang 
Official exchange rate is Rp. 1,655/US$ in 1987. 
Beef 
DRCR 
0.30 
0.29 
0.25 
0.26 
0.64 
0.66 
Q.57 
0.58 
0.60 
0.59 
0.60 
DRC NEB 
496 20,671 
476 217,576 
419 239,217 
430 235,573 
1,067 108,830 
1,087 102,978 
946 141,976 
962 138,332 
989 89,293 
971 105,543 
990 102,445' 
Table 12 shows that the beef production is economicly feasible in all produ-
cing regions, all types of technology and all trade regimes. The data from this table 
indicate that beef production is economicly~feasible either for domestic consump-
tion or exportation. 
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Table 12. Summary of domestic resource cost criteria of beef production, 1987 (for kg carcass). 
Producing Technology Trade Domestic Domestic Net 
region regimes resource resource economic 
cost ratio cost benefit 
East Nusa Free grazing IR 0.40231 665.82 260537 
Tenggara (Household) IS 0.30745 508.84 319425 
EP 0.28883 478.00 356644 
East Nusa Tied system IR 0.37531 621.14 277301 
Tenggara (Household) IS 0.28353 469.24 336189 
EP 0.26708 442.02 373408 
Central Java Fattening IR 0.52808 873.97 165613 
(Household IS 0.48280 799.03 187052 
EP 0.44199 731.50 224271 
West Java Fattening IR 0.61960 1025.13 100275 
(Corporate) IS 0.59173 979.32 109230 
EP 0.54751 906.13 137494 
Notes: Official exchange rate in 1987 was Rp. 1,655/US$. 
The most efficient producing region is East Nusa Tenggara. The tied system 
is a little more efficient than the free grazing system. As it has been mentioned the 
beef farming system in Nusa Tenggara is a whole system, where the farmers rear 
the animal since the starter stage. The farming system in Central and West Java 
is fattening. The farmings in Central Java are a household business whereas in West 
Java the sample is a corporate business. From the data in the table we can see that 
the household fattening is more efficient than the coporate fattening in terms of 
resource use. 
It we look at by trade regimes, the data show that the export promotion 
regime is the most efficient one, and then followed by import substitution and 
interregional trade regimes. Accordingly, the present system, where the beef 
produced in East Nusa Tenggara, East Java, and West Java, and then transported 
to West Java and Jakarta is not the most beneficial trade arrangement economical-
ly. Perhaps, the more beneficial alternative is exportation of the beef from the pro-
ducing regions, and importing from abroad the meat requirement of the deficit 
region. The present interregional trade is not efficient because the animal must be 
transported alive from the producing regions. As we know, Jakarta is far away 
from East Nusa Tenggara. Therefore for efficiency reason the beef should be 
process in the production and the processed products then transported to con-
suming regions in Java. 
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Chicken (Broiler and Layer) 
From Table 13 we can see that the domestic resource ratios of the chicken 
meat productions were below unity in all producing regions under all trade 
regimes. Accordingly, the broiler farming is economically efficient and has compa-
rative advantage and be able to compete in domestic and world markets. 
If we look at by producing region, we can see that the most efficient producing 
regime is in Bogor, than followed by Tasikmalaya and Lampung. Both Bogor and 
Tasikmalaya are located in West Java. Hence West Java is a very efficient region 
of producing chicken meat. 
Table 13. Summary of chicken meat comparative advantage criteria, 1987 (for 100 kg carcass). 
Producing 
region 
Lampung 
Tasikmalaya 
Bog or 
Notes: IR 
IS 
Trade 
regimes 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
Interregional trade. 
Import Substitution. 
EP Export Promotion. 
Resource 
cost ratio 
0.5343 
0.3290 
0.3479 
0.5106 
0.1940 
0.5376 
0.2379 
0.1944 
0.2546 
Exchange rate in 1987 was Rp. 1,655/US$. 
Domestic Net income 
resource benefit 
cost (Rp/$) (Rp) 
884 62,553 
545 109,257 
576 104,820 
845 59,802 
321 141,933 
890 55,975 
394 135,586 
322 151,243 
421 131,759 
West Java is the largest broiler producer in the country. This large production, 
therefore, is consistent with the very efficient resource cost. Broiler production in 
Lampung is still very low, but it is increasing very rapidly in recent years. Both West 
Java and Lampung are very close to Jakarta, the largest consuming area in the 
country. Therefore, poultry farmings in West Java and Lampung have a large 
potential to further developing in the future. 
From this study we can conclude that the broiler industry in Indonesia is quite 
efficient. It is very competitive in international market. But the more beneficial use 
of the broiler production is for domestic consumption, especially for import substi-
tution. The more efficient producing region is West Java. This is consistent with 
the fact that this region is the largest broiler producer in the country. Broiler pro-
duction in Indonesia should be promoted. 
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Egg production in Lampung is economicly feasible under the three trade 
regimes. For Tasikmalaya, the egg production is not economicly feasible for 
exportation and interregional trade. But it is very efficient for import substitution 
(Table 14). 
Egg production in Bogor is feasible under the import substitution and inter-
regional trade regime but not feasible for exportation. Consequently, the highest 
economic benefit generated from the egg production is under the import substitu-
tion regime. Clearly, the net economic benefits obtained under the interregional and 
export promotion regime are far below the import substitution trade regimes. 
Hence egg production in Bogor should be directed for import substitution. 
Table 14. Summary of the comparative advantage criteria for chicken egg production, 1987 (per 100 kg). 
Producing Trade Resource Domestic Net economic 
region regimes cost ratio resource benefit 
cost (Rp 100/kg) 
Lampung IR 0.4988 825.51 23,290 
IS 0.1925 318.59 59,892 
EP 0.2235 369.89 55,862 
Tasikmalaya IR 1.9808 3278.22 -16,123 
IS 0.4239 701.55 25,085 
EP 2.3055 3815.60 -19,960 
Bogor IR 0.8350 1381.93 35.518 
IS 0.3689 610.53 22,271 
EP 1.0111 1673.37 - 224 
Notes: IR Interregional Trade. 
IS Import Substitution. 
EP Export Promotion. 
Exchange Rate in 1987 was Rp 1655/US$. 
Based on these findings we can conclude that the most efficient egg producing 
region is Lampung. The egg production in Lampung can be efficiently used either 
for domestic consumption or exportation. Presently, the egg production in 
Lampung is still very low. Nevertheless, it has been increasing very rapidly in 
recent years. The egg production in Lampung could be directed especially for 
exportation. This region is close to Singapore. The feed materials in this region are 
also abundant. Lampung is a surplus region of corn, cassava and rice. 
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As it has been mentioned that the policy incentive indicators used in this study 
are Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), Effective Protection Rate (EPR) and Implicit 
Tariff (IT). The incentive indicators will be computed by regions and trade regimes. 
Com 
Table 15 shows that the nominal protection rates are negative in West Java, 
East Java and Sulawesi. These three regions produce large amount of corn. The 
highest nominal protection rates are for Jakarta and Kalimantan. These two 
regions are corn deficit regions. These findings shows that the protection, is biased 
toward consumers. Sulawesi one of the most efficient producing region was penalized 
instead of protected. East Java the largest corn producing area was also penalized. 
Table 15. Nominal protection rate (NPR) of com by region, 1986. 
Region Import Wholesale NPR ("lo) parity (Rp/kg) (Rp/kg) 
West Java 177.27 175.54 -0.98 
Central Java 172.03 200.13 16.3 
East Java 172.51 139.49 -19.14 
Sumatera 172.31 179.38 4.10 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara 172.66 186.32 7.91 
South Sulawesi 173.08 140.27 -18.96 
Kalimantan 173.73 212.54 22.34 
Jakarta 168.31 206.54 22.71 
The lowest effective protection rates are in Sulawesi and West Java. The effec-
tive protection rates in Sulawesi are even negative under the interregional and 
import substitution trade regimes (Table 16). As it has been mentioned earlier, corn 
Table 16. Summary of effective protection and implicit tariff on com by region and trade regimes, 1986. 
Region 
West Java 
Central Java 
East Java 
Sumatera 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
Bali & Nusa 
Tenggara 
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Effective protection ("lo) 
IR IS EP 
3.10 4.71 
28.46 20.60 6.86 
31.66 -17.81 4.42 
33.30 10.49 6.08 
24.06 24.06 0.05 
-21.45 -20.09 0.48 
24.03 8.24 -0.57 
Implicit tariff ("lo) 
IR IS EP 
-32.71 -23.01 
-15.16 -24.78 -4731 
-18.11 -27.95 -21.92 
-26.33 -32.35 -26.35 
-5.78 -0.47 
-0.20 -7.43 -3.34 
9.17 3.05 5.46 
production in Sulawesi is very efficient. Hence, inhibiting com production in this 
area is a misleading policy. 
The effective protection rate in East Java under the import substitution regime 
is also negative. This is due to the negative nominal protection rate in this region. 
The effective protection rates are generally very high under the interregional trade 
regime. The negative effective protection rate in Sulawesi is partly due to the 
negative nominal protection rates. 
With exception to Bali & Nusa Tenggara, the implicit tariff rates are negative. 
This indicates that the farmers generally enjoy input subsidies. The higher 
subsidies received by the Javanese farmers. This is reasonable since com farming 
in Java is very intensive in using fertilizers. Fertilizers are highly subsidized by the 
Government. 
Soybean 
The highest effective protection rates are for the interregional trade regime, 
and the lowest are for the export promotion regimes. This indicates that the protec-
tion policies are biased toward domestic producer and domestic market. This is 
commonly known as inward looking strategy. This is consistent with the nature of 
soybean production. As it has been shown previously the soybean production is most 
efficient in resource use under the interregional trade regime, and followed by the 
import substitution trade regime. Input subsidy structure has simililar pattern with 
the effective protection (Table 17). 
This analysis shows clearly that the structure of economic incentives for 
soybean is biased toward domestic market. The protection for the interregional and 
import substitution regimes come from both output price supports and input 
subsidies, but the protection through output price is the highest one. 
Table 17. Economic incentives indicators of soybean production in 1986. 
Producing Region Effective Protection rate 
West Java 
Central Java 
East Java 
Sumatera 
Kalimantan 
Sulawesi 
Bali & Nusa 
Tenggara 
Note: IR 
IS 
IR 
100.78 
102.85 
75.23 
Interregional trade. 
Import Substitution. 
EP = Export Promotion. 
IS EP 
81.59 6.72 
62.61 1.91 
67.92 2.23 
71.20 2.57 
83.91 4.52 
42.08 1.07 
83.66 0.15 
Implicit Tariff 
IR IS 
-51.04 
-19.93 -28.22 
-18.69 -27.31 
-24.30 
-41.37 
-12.20 
- 1.15 - 1.70 
EP 
-41.39 
-20.76 
-20.67 
-21.00 
-33.64 
- 3.53 
1.71 
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Regional structure of the incentives, however, is not quite good. The least 
efficient producing regions, such as West Java and Kalimantan, enjoyed the 
highest incentives while the most efficient producing region such as Sulawesi enjoy-
ed the least incentives. The economic incentives should be given primarily to the 
most efficient region such as Sulawesi, Sumatera, Bali and Nusa Tenggara. This 
can be done by improving domestic market efficiency and promoting intensifica-
tion program in the areas. 
Table 18 shows that the highest nominal protection rate is for Jakarta reaching 
90.62 percent. Jakarta is not a producing region. It is a major consuming region. 
The lowest nominal protection rate is for Sulawesi which is the most efficient 
producing region. Clearly, the structure of the nominal protection is not conduc-
tive in directing production towards the most efficient region. There is an indica-
tion that the protection is biased toward consumers. 
Table 18. Nominal protection rate (NPR) of soybean, 1986 (OJo). 
Region 
Wholesale Import NPR 
(Rp/kg) Parity (Rp/kg) (%) 
West Java 586.54 347.80 68.64 
Central Java 538.60 343.63 56.74 
East Java 553.21 344.35 60.65 
Sumatera 561.00 343.38 63.38 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara 586.40 344.04 70.45 
Sulawesi 468.77 346.20 35.40 
Kalimantan 590.87 345.03 71.25 
Jakarta 639.47 335.47 90.62 
Cassava 
From Table 19 we can see that the nominal protection rates were positive in 
all regions. The lowest nominal-protection rate was in Sumatera and then followed 
by East Java, West Java and Central Java reSpectively. These four regions are the 
major dried cassava exporting regions in the country. This findings indicate that 
the higher descrepancy between border price and domestic price, the more open 
producing region to the world market is. 
The implicit tariff of the cassava production were all positive. This indicates 
that the dried cassava production did not receive input subsidies. Instead, the 
farmers paid higher actual input prices than their economic prices. As the result, 
the effective protection is also negative in all region. The negative effective protec-
tion indicates that the farmers pay a positive net taxes. The effective tax rates, 
however, were very low. The effective protection were very close to zero in all 
regions. In other words, the cassava production in Indonesia practically did not 
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receive a net protection. As we can see from Table 19 that the effective protections 
were around -1.0 percent or lower in all regions. 
Table 19. Summary of policy incentive indicator for dried cassava, 1986 (OJo). 
Producing Region Nominal Effective Implicit Protection* Protection*" Tariff*" 
West Java 21.53 -0.45 5.28 
Central Java 16.54 -0.40 5.02 
East Java 15.76 -0.11 1.14 
Sumatera 0.10 -0.61 6.81 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara 53.29 -0.90 10.03 
Sulawesi 87.27 -1.01 9.93 
Kalimantan 31.22 -0.76 9.97 
• At whole sale level; •• At border level. 
Rice 
The nominal protection rates for rice in each region are presented in Table 20. 
The table shows that in some areas like in Sulawesi, East Java, Sumatera and Bali 
& Nusa Tenggara have negative NPR. In Central Java the nominal protection rate 
is very small, only 0.75 percent. Clearly, they are two regions which enjoy protec-
tion, they are West Java and Kalimantan. 
Table 20. Nominal protection on rice, 1986. 
Region Wholesale Import Parity NPR (Rp/kg) (Rp/kg) (%) 
West Java 356.23 344.57 33.84 
Central Java 343.10 340.56 0.75 
East Java 308.35 340.56 -9.46 
Sumatera 311.56 342.46 -9.02 
Sulawesi 284.13 345.89 -17.86 
Kalimantan 421.57 342.78 22.99 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara 322.08 342.78 -6.04 
The other incentive criteria computed in this study are effective protection and 
implicit tariff. The two criteria are summarized in Table 21. The data in the table 
show that the effective protection rates are always positive under the interregional 
trade regime and the implicit tariffs are negative in all region which indicate the 
existance of input subsidies. These two factors make positive economic incentives 
under the interregional trade regime. 
Under the import substitution regime, the effective protection rates are 
positive in West Java, Central Java and Kalimantan, whereas in other regions they 
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are all negative. The highest effective protection rate is in Kalimantan at 28.08 
percent. The absolute value of the effective protection rates in other regions are 
quite small, less than ten percent. 
Table 21. Summary of economic incentive indicators on rice, 1986. 
Region Effective Protection (OJo) Implicit Tariff (%) 
IR IS EP IR IS EP 
West Java 6.26 6.26 2.14 -39.54 -39.54 -20.35 
Central Java 3.99 2.08 -41.72 -20.67 
East Java 5.31 -6.60 2.36 -44.44 -42.93 -21.66 
Sumatera 24.66 -7.05 1.89 -44.82 -38.76 -19.72 
Sulawesi 3.48 -4.55 2.06 -46.54 -44.23 -16.18 
Kalimantan 28.08 0.63 -41.54 -6.88 
Bali & Nusa -3.14 0.77 -43.00 -8.65 
Tenggara 
IR = Interregional Trade; IS = Import Substitution; 
EP = Export Promotion. 
The effective protection rates under the export promotion trade regime are 
positive in all regions. But the level of the protection, however, are very small. We 
may say that there is no significant protection under the export promotion regime 
and Indonesia will be competitive in the world market. 
The implicit tariffs are negative in all regions and all trade regimes. This is due 
to the existence of a large input subsidies on rice farming. The highest input 
subsidies are under the interregional trade regimes. The absolute implicit tariffs under 
the import subsitution regime are also high. The absolute value of the implicit 
tariff rates are much lower than under the interregional or implicit trade regimes. 
We may conclude that the Government incentives were largely channelled through 
input subsidy. The protection is biased toward domestic use of the rice production. 
This policy orientation is consistent with efficient resource use. As we have shown 
earlier, the most efficient resource cost allocations are under the interregional trade 
regime and then followed by the import subsitution regime. 
Dairy 
The nominal protection rates of selected livestock products in selected regions 
are presented in Table 22. From the table we can see that the NPR's are generally 
negative except for milk products (Anhydrous Milk Fat and Skimmed Milk 
Powder). These show the existence of export barriers for the pork meat, beef, chicken 
meat and chicken egg. The wholesale prices of those livestock products are lower 
than their border prices. This reflects the high potential of exporting the products. 
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The negative NPR also indicates that the pork, beef and poultry farmings do not 
enjoy government protection through price support, instead they are inhibited to 
obtain higher prices by the existence of trade barriers. 
Table 22. Nominal protection rates of livestock productions by region, 1987 (llJo). 
Region Swine Beef Poultry Chicken Anhydrous Skimmed 
meat carcass meat egg milk fat milk powder 
Central Java -32.12 -24.89 -38.85 -11.58 158.71 137.93 
East Java -13.93 -32.70 -36.45 -22.12 161.08 141.22 
Jakarta 1.70 -20.41 -38.04 -23.78 162.26 142.87 
East Nusa Tenggara -42.34 -52.38 -38.04 
Bali -39.40 -39.38 
South Kalimantan 0 -23.40 
Lampung -42.34 24.28 
The Nominal Protection Rates for milk products, however, are positive and 
very high (Table 22). Both anhydrous milk fat and simmed milk powder are raw 
materials in producing processed milk. The high nominal protection rate for these 
two products demonstrates the high protection enjoy by the dairy sector. The milk 
processors pay a higher price of domestic produced milk than the imported raw 
material. That is why they tend to use the imported raw material. 
The milk import is controlled by the government through the milk ratio quota 
as a non tariff barrier trade policy. The milk processor may import raw milk in 
proportion to its domestic produced milk purchased. Clearly, this milk ratio policy 
is an effective way of to force the milk processors using domestic milk. Otherwise, 
they would use the cheaper imported raw milk. Without the milk ratio policy, the 
fresh milk price at the farm level would fall drastically from the present level. 
Dairy industry enjoys the highest protection rates among the livestock 
industries (Table 23). Most of the protection come from the output price protec-
tion. This is shown by the low level of the implicit tariff rates on inputs. 
The effective protection rates vary with the type of farm enterprise and breed. 
The corporate farming with imported breed enjoys the highest protection. For the 
smallholder farmer, the higher protection is also for the user of imported breed. 
This finding tells us that the survival of the dairy industry merely due to the 
excessive protection from the Government. The industry is highly inefficient in terms 
of resource allocation as it has been shown in the previous section. The protection 
is biased toward domestic market. 
This study also shows that the protection policy is biased toward the corporate 
farmers and the imported breed users. This is inconsistent with the resource 
economic efficiency criterion. From the previous section we have seen that the most 
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Table 23. Economic incentive criteria of milk production, 1987. 
Trade Location Effective Implicit 
Location Technology regimes of whole protection tariff 
sale 
Central Java Import breed IR Jakarta 284.45 6.43 
corporate Surabaya 197.21 4.98 
Ban dung 226.61 5.03 
IS Salatiga 226.60 4.78 
EP Semarang 230.38 5.-31 
Central Java Cross breed IR Jakarta 120.49 3.25 
corporate Surabaya 80.58 2.99 
Bandung 94.07 3.07 
IS Salatiga 102.48 2.65 
EP Semarang 101.98 3.29 
Central Java Imported IR Jakarta 255.74 5.84 
breed 
smallholder Surabaya 2B.27 5.66 
Bandung 231.06 5.72 
IS Salatiga 220.11 5.42 
EP Semarang 223.33 6.16 
Smallholder IR Jakarta 83.87 6.68 
Surabaya 47.56 6.58 
Ban dung 59.92 6.61 
IS Salatiga 70.48 6.43 
EP Semarang 69.62 6.97 
efficient type of farming interms of resource use are household farmings and users 
of cross breed. The corporate farming policy biased is not consistent with the 
Government objective to promote the smallholder either. 
Pork 
The effective protections for porkmeat are negative in all producing regions, 
all technologies and all trade regimes, except for interregional trade regime of 
swine meat production in Central Java (Table 24). Therefore, the swine production 
is burdened with a net effective tariff. The effective tariff rate is the highest for 
the household unintensive farmer and intensive corp_orate. In general, the government 
protection is biased toward corporate and intensive farming. 
The negative effective protection for the swine production is largely due to the 
existence of tariff on input. As we can see from Table 24, the implicit tariff rates 
are always positive, except for the corporate farmers in Central Java. For the 
intensive corporate farmers the implicit tariff rates are negative for all trade regimes. 
26 
The implicit tariff rates for the unintensive farming are generally higher than the 
intensive farming. This again shows that the government incentives are biased 
toward the corporate and intensive farmers. 
Table 24. Effective protection rates (EPR) and implicit tariff (IT) of swine meat production, 1987. 
Producing Technology Trade Wholesale Effective Implicit Region regimes location Protection Tariff 
Bali Unintensive IR Kalimantan -17.74 73.26 
household Surabaya -32.85 69.43 
IS Bali -63.17 71.77 
EP Bali -63.08 71.22 
Bali Intensive IR Kalimantan -8.89 45.07 
Surabaya -19.41 38.97 
IS Bali -53.15 40.71 
EP Bali -52.98 40.34 
Central Intensive IR Jakarta 7.71 -11.29 
Java corporate IS Semarang -42.15 -10.38 
EP Semarang -41.96 -10.33 
Part of the disincentives come from output price. This is shown by the negative 
nominal protection rates. The large negative nominal protection rates are due to 
the existence of market segmentation between the domestic and international 
markets. Pork meat export promotion by lifting any barriers would increase the 
domestic price. This higher price should give the farmers incentive to increase 
production. In other words export promotion is a good policy for the pork 
industry development. This policy is also supported by the fact that the pig farming 
is competitive in international market. 
Beef 
The economic incentive indicators of beef production are presented in Table 
25. The effective protection rates are negative in all regions and all trade regimes. 
This reflects the existence of effective disincentive for the beef production. The 
disincentives vary by trade regimes. The highest disincentives are under the export 
promotion regime and then followed by import substitution .and interregional 
trade regimes respectively. This, .again, shows the domestic market orientation of 
the Government policies. 
The implicit tariff rates are positive for all producing regions under all trade 
regimes. Clearly, a major portion of the disincentives is arised from the tariff on 
inputs. 
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Table 25. Summary of economic incentive criteria for beef production, 1987. 
Location Technology Trade Effective 
Implicit 
regimes Protection Tariff 
East Nusa Free grazing IR -23.80 26.70 
Tenggara Smallbolder IS -48.11 19.82 
EP -52.12 18.70 
East Nusa Tied System IR -23.80 26.71 
Tenggara Smallbolder IS -48.10 19.82 
EP -52.11 18.70 
Central Fattening IR -43.03 63.24 
Java Smallbolder IS -46.17 67.92 
EP -51.14 67.52 
West Java Fattening ,IR -76.55 66.27 
corporate EP -89.44 66.08 
In addition through input prices, a large portion of the disincentive is also 
channelled through output price. This is shown by large negative nominal protec-
tion rates. The negative nominal protection rate indicates that the domestic price 
is lower than international price. In other words, the producer should have 
received higher price if the country is open to competitive international price. 
The large negative nominal protection rates are clearly due to the prohibition 
of beef export. Without any doubt this policy is designed to protect the domestic 
consumers. But this policy, of course, hurts the farmers. The large disincentives, 
clearly, inhibit the beef farming development. Therefore, if the government 
efforts to develop the beef industry these disincentives must be removed or 
reduced. The most important one is removing the export ban. The export promo-
tion will give various benefits such as raise the price received by the farmers which 
will induce production and farmers income. At the same time the government will 
also receive foreign exchange that is very crucial in present condition as the oil 
export falling and unstable. To really develop the export potential quality of the 
products need to be improved. 
Broiler 
The broiler meat effective protection and implicit tariff rates are summarized 
in Table 26. From the table we can see that the effective protection rates are always 
negative. This is an indication of the existence of effective disincentive for the 
broiler farming. The rate of the effective disincentives are extremely high. 
Part of the disincentives are channelled through input tariffs. As Table 26 shows, 
all of the implicit tariff rates are positive. These tariff rates, however, are very low 
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compared with the level of effectives. Hence, the larger portion of the disincentives 
is channelled through output export prohibitions. 
A larger portion of the disincentive was arised from the depressed output 
price. The price depression is shown by the negative sign of nominal effective 
protection rates. As we can see from Table 22, the nominal protection rates for 
the chicken meat are the largest negative among the livestock products. 
Table 26. Effective protection rates (NPR) and implicit tariff on poultry meat, 1987 (OJo). 
Producing 
Region 
Larnpung 
Tasikmalaya 
Bogor 
Trade 
regime 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
IR 
IS 
EP 
Effective Implicit 
Protection Tariff 
-91.38 12.65 
-91.99 13.17 
-92.28 13.11 
-82.92 12.65 
-90.00 13.18 
-83.02 12.68 
-72.76 12.39 
-83.03 12.45 
-72.70 12.34 
The large negative nominal protection rates indicate that the domestic price is 
lower than the international price. If the domestic market was open to the interna-
tional price, the chicken meat price should have been higher. This is an indication 
that one of the reason for the wide spread of the broiler farming profit loss was 
the non-existence of broiler export. 
From the previous section we have shown that the broiler production is very 
efficient. It is quite competitive in international market. The fact for this poultry 
meat exportation is not fully realized because it is clearly due to the existence of 
the effective disincentives. These disincentives are net effective support for 
consumers at the expense of the producers. The government policies are biased 
toward consumers. 
The export promotion strategy is expected to help increase the price received 
by the farmers. This higher price is an important factor for the development of the 
broiler industry and the farmers income. Perhaps, the existing price of the broiler 
farming development could not be sustained unless the opening up of the export 
market. 
Eggs 
Financially, the egg production in Tasikmalaya and Lampung generates nega-
tive value added under all trade regimes. But, economicly it generates positive 
value added. This shows the existence of high effective disincentive on egg produc-
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tion. The incentive criteria are summarized in Table 27. From the table we can also 
see that the financial value added is positive only for Lampung. The effective 
protection rate in Lampung is positive under the import substitution and export 
promotion trade regime. It is negative under the interregional trade regime. This 
findings indicate the existence of prohibitive disincentives on the egg production. 
It seems that disincentives are so large making the financial value added negative, 
and it means that the egg production is not a viable business. This is also shown 
in the previous section. 
Table 27. Summary of the incentive criteria for egg production, 1987 (per 100 kg/egg). 
Trade Value added Effective Implicit 
Region regime protection tariff 
Financial Economic 
Lampung IR 265 798 -66.79 18.16 
IS 1062 862 23.20 19.40 
EP 1059 839 26.22 19.33 
Tasikmalaya IR -159 435 -136.55 17.80 
IS - 91 650 -114.00 18.79 
EP - 165 410 -140.24 17.81 
Bogor IR -162 432 -137.50 19.60 
IS ~ 178 540 -132.96 19.75 
EP -167 408 -140.93 19.51 
Part of the disincentives in the egg production is channelled through the 
inputs. As we can see from the table that the implicit tariff rates for inputs are 
positive in all regions and all trade regimes. The implicit tariff rates are quite 
similar in all regions and all trade regimes. They are all around 19 percent clearly, 
this level is very small compared with the effective disincentive rates in West Java. 
Accordingly, a large portion of the disincentives must be arised from the effective 
taxation on output. 
The disincentive through output price can be measured by the nominal protec-
tion rate. The negative nominal protection rate in West Java contributes to the high 
negative effective protection rate. In Lampung, on the other hand, the positive 
nominal protection rate out balances the disincentive through input tariffs which 
makes the effective protection rate positive under the import substitution and 
export promotion trade regime. 
From this study we can conclude that there is a large effective disincentive on 
egg production. The disincentive has reached the prohibitive point which makes the 
production is not financially profitable. The financial value added is negative, 
especially in West Java, although the economic value added is positive. 
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In the previous section we have seen that the egg production is economicly 
feasible in all regions and all trade regimes, except for export promotion in Tasik-
malaya. The existence of the large effective disincentive prohibits realization of the 
economic benefit which could be generated from the egg production. Accordingly, 
the Government disincentives must be lifted for the development of the egg 
production. One of the recommended policies is promotion of the egg exportation. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
Com production is economicly feasible under the interregional trade and 
import substitution trade regimes. Hence, for the economic efficiency the com 
domestic production should be primarily used for domestic use. More specific, the 
com would be more efficient if used locally as import substitute. However, by 
improving yield com production could be efficient as export promotion. 
Under the export promotion regime, the com production is not feasible in West 
Java and East Java. The com production in Sumatera and Central Java is barely 
feasible for exportation. The com exportation is only feasible if produced in Bali 
and Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. This again, shows that the 
domestically produced com in most of com producing region would be more 
beneficial economicly if used for domestic consumption. By improving tech-
nology the economic efficiency can be improved. 
The most efficient com producing regions in Indonesia are Bali and Nusa 
Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Presently, the com production, 
however, is concentrated in Java and Sumatera. Various supports are also concen-
trated in these two islands. This biased government supports are not consistent with 
the economic efficiency criterion. Accordingly, the government should shift its 
supports toward other regions such as Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and 
Kalimantan. These three regions are highly potential for com production not only 
because of production efficiency but also because of land availability. The land in 
these three regions is relatively more abundant than in Java or Sumatera. In 
addition, the com production in these regions is still unintensive. The com produc-
tivity could be increase significantly through intensification program. In other words, 
the com production in Kalimantan and Sulawesi could be increased significantly 
by both increasing planted area and yield. 
The suggested com trade direction for producing region is as follows: 
West Java ------------------------------------------------ West Java 
Central Java -------------------------------------------- - Central Java 
-Jakarta 
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East Java ------------------------------------------------- -East Java 
-Jakarta 
Sumatera ------------------------------------------------- - Sumatera 
-Jakarta 
Bali & Nusa Tenggara --------------------------------- - Kalimantan 
- Denpasar 
Sulawesi --------------------------------------------------- - Sulawesi 
-Export 
Kalimantan ----------------------------------------------- - Kalimantan 
- Balikpapan 
Soybean is not yet economicly feasible to be produced under all trade regimes 
in West Java. For East Java, the soybean production is only feasible under the 
import substitution trade regime and is not feasible under the interregional nor 
under the export promotion trade regimes. Clearly, West Java and East Java are 
not efficient in producing soybean. It would be more beneficial if the soybean 
farmings in these two provinces substituted with corn farmings. 
The soybean production is quite efficient if produced in Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa 
Tenggara, Sumatera, Kalimantan and Central Java, under all trade regimes. 
Indonesia will be highly, competitive in the world soybean market if the soybean 
production is arranged properly. The most efficient producing regions are Sula-
wesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, Sumatera, Central Java and Kalimantan. The 
government, therefore, should promote the soybean production in these regions, 
and inhibit soybean production in West Java and East Java. 
The soybean producers enjoy high government protection, under the inter-
regional and import substitution trade regimes. Clearly, the government protection 
are biased toward domestic market. This biased policies are reasonable since the 
soybean production is more efficient in resource used under the import substitu-
tion and interregional trade regimes. Moreover, Indonesia is still a net importer 
soybean. A large portion of the government supports are channelled through inputs. 
The structure of the government protection is not quite good. West Java which 
is the most inefficient soybean producing region, but enjoys the largest protection. 
Whereas Sulawesi, the most efficient producing region enjoys the lowest protec-
tion. The government protection in East Java is also high although it is not 
efficient in soybean production. Accordingly, the government should rearrang 
its corn incentive policies toward the most efficient producing regions. The 
efficient soybean producing regions are Sulawesi, Bali and Nusa Tenggara, 
Sumatera, Central Java and Kalimantan. 
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As expected, Indonesia is very efficient in cassava production. The domestic 
resource cost ratios are very low in all regions. The government incentives to the 
cassava producers do not exist. In fact the producers pay a positive effective net 
disincen,tives. Since it is highly efficient and competitive in the world market, the 
government should promote the cassava production. The cassava production may 
be directed for exportation, this can be promoted by deregulating and improving 
efficiency of the cassava marketing. 
Cassava intensification program could also increase profitability of the 
cassava farming. In addition, it also increases production efficiency, and hence 
competitiveness in the world market. For this, the government may take a crucial 
role in promoting research on cassava seed, farming system, quality of the products 
and new products development. 
Indonesia is quite efficient in rice production in all regions and all trade 
regimes. Hence, the government rice self sufficiency is consistent with the 
economic efficiency criterion. In terms of resource efficiency, the rice production 
outside Java is more efficient than in Java. But presently, most of the rice is 
produced in Java. The rice intensification programs are also concentrated in Java. 
Therefore, the government attention should be redirected toward promotion of 
rice production outside Java. This policy reorientation is not only important for 
economic efficiency but also for increasing total production, improving farmers' 
income and employment creation. Outside Java is more potential for increasing 
rice production in the future either through acreage expansion or yield enhancement. 
The effective protection rates on rice are generally very low, especially under 
the export promotion trade regime. Under the import substitution trade regime, 
the effective protection rates are even negative in most of the producing regions. 
This indicates the existence of net disincentives on rice production. The rice 
producers, however, enjoy a high inputs subsidies from the government. This is 
shown by the negative implicit tariff. 
Pork production in Indonesia is economicly feasible either for domestic use 
(interregional trade and import substitution) or for export. The pork exportation 
is highly competitive in the international market. Hence it has a very good prospect 
for exportation. However, quality of the product have to be improved. The inten-
sive household pig farming is more efficient than the corporate farming. This 
indicates that the pork production in Indonesia should be directed toward the 
household intensive farming. This ·orientation is consistent with the government 
objectives to increase farmers income and improve income distribution. 
One of the problem with the pork production is the existence of excessive 
government disincentives. This study shows that the effective protection rates on 
pork meat are negative. The largest disincentives are faced by the household 
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farmers which are the more efficient producers. Since the pork production is highly 
competitive in the international market, all these incentives should be removed to 
promote the exportation and the pork industry development. 
Chicken meat production in Indonesia is highly efficient and econoniicly com-
petitive in international market. In other words, Indonesia has a high potential for 
exporting the chicken meat. The efficiency differentials between import substitu-
tion regime and the other trade regimes are quite large. This reflects that the chicken 
meat production would be more beneficial if it primarily used for domestic 
consumption. The excess supply can be exported however. Presently, Indonesia has 
not exported chicken meat. Promoting the exports would be a very important 
factor in promoting the broiler industry development. 
Although the chicken meat production is highly efficient economically, it is 
however inhibited by the government disincentives. The effective protection rates 
on the chicken meat are negative with high absolute values. The disincentives 
arised from both final product and inputs tariffs. The nominal protection rates are 
negative, whereas the implicit tariffs are positive. Since the chicken meat produc-
tion is highly efficient economicly and competitive in international. market, then 
it should be promoted by the government. For this, the chicken meat should be 
open for exportation by lifting restictions including the non tarift: barriers. The 
trade deregulation campaigns presently conducted by the government would enhan-
ce the broiler industry development. 
The chicken egg production in Lampung is much more efficient economicly 
than in West Java. Hence the egg production in this region is highly efficient and 
competitive in the international market. Accordingly, the egg production in this 
region should be promoted either for domestic use or for exportation. Presently, 
the egg production is heavily concentrated in West Java. This study shows the need 
to redistributing the egg producing regions. 
The chicken egg production in West Java is highly efficient under the import 
substitution regime. The egg production is not even economicly feasible under 
the export promotion trade regime for both Tasikmalaya and Bogar. Accordingly, 
the egg production in West Java should be directed for domestic consumption. 
Financially, the egg production in West Java generates negative value added under 
all trade regimes. Economicly, however, the value added is positive. This shows 
the existence of high disincentives on egg production in this region. These high 
disincentives have reached the prohibitive point which make the production is not 
financially profitable. The disincentives on egg are channelled through both output 
and inputs. Both the nominal protection rate is negative whereas implicit tariffs 
are positive. Accm-dingly, these disincentives must be lifted for the development 
of the egg production. One of the recomended policy is deregulation of both egg 
and feed grain markets. 
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Beef production in Indonesia is highly efficient and competitive in interna-
tional market. The most efficient trade regime is export promotion and then 
followed by import substitution and interregional trade. The present trading system, 
where the beef produced in East Nusa Tenggara and East Java, and then trans-
ported live animal to West Java, Jakarta and other deficit regions, is not efficient 
economicly. The more beneficial trade arrangement is exportation of the beef from 
the producing regions in the form of processed products. 
The household beef farming is more efficient than the corporated farming in 
terms of resource use. Therefore, the beef farming development may be concentra-
ted on the household farming. This is also consistent with income distribution and 
employment creation objectives. Without any doubt, the beef family farming is more 
labor intensive than the large corporate farming. 
The effective protection rates on beef are negative in all producing regions and 
all trade regimes. The highest disincentives are under the export promotion regime 
and then followed by import substitution and interregional trade respectively. This 
indicates that the beef production is directed primarily for domestic use. The 
disincentives should be lifted to promote the beef farming which is proven to be 
highly efficient economically. . 
The milk production in Indonesia is not yet. efficient economicly, mainly due 
to still relatively low dairy cow productivity compared to other countries. The 
interregional trade regime is extreemly inefficient. Accordingly, if the milk must 
be produced domestically, then it should be intended for import substitute. This 
means that the milk processing must be located in the same location with the dairy 
farms. This consolidation of the dairy farming and milk processing plants location 
is useful to reduce transportation cost. 
The raw material for the deficit milk processing region may be imported from 
abroad, rather than transported from other fresh milk producing regions. This 
implies that the government should allow importation of the milk raw material to 
meet the deficit in the large processing industrial complex, such as Jakarta. This 
kind of trade and industrial location arrangement is proposed until domestic milk 
farming efficiency can be increased. Improving production efficiency should be the 
first priority for the long-term survival of the domestic dairy sector. 
The dairy sector is highly protected by the government. The effective protec-
tion rates for the dairy sector are extreemly high. This indicates that the survival 
of the dairy sector is merely due to the excessive protection. Most of the protection 
on milk is channelled through output. 
The cross breed dairy farming is much better than the imported breed. This 
indicates that the cross breed is more suitable than the imported breed in Indone-
sia. This is especially true for the small family farming and it is more efficient than the 
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large corporate farming. Accordingly, the dairy farming development should be 
directed toward small family farming and using cross· breed. 
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